Algeria: A Threat to World Peace by Thomas B. Hunter

Last week, the French public, in an annual opinion poll conducted by the French military, agreed that Algeria is the most threatening country to world peace. The survey released Thursday, September 18 revealed 59 percent of the French felt this way as opposed to 40% last year. The poll also showed 61% of the public saw terrorism as the threat they were most worried about, a figure equal to last year but 10 points higher than in 1994, the year before a wave of bombings in France claimed by Algerian fundamentalists. Algeria has been the site of mounting violence by Moslem extremists. The north African state, a former French colony, has been swept by a wave of fear and panic following a series of guerrilla attacks in which hundreds of civilians have been killed in night massacres. At the same time, the Algerian military has mounted counter-attacks on sites believed to be under guerrilla control. The major guerrilla group, the Armed Islamic Group (AIG) is at the center of most of the recent violence. In Algeria, the group is known as the GIA (Groupe Islamiste Arme).

The AIG was a peaceful political movement prior to 1992, when President Bendjedid was oustered and the national elections were canceled. Since then, this Muslim-based group has become the most militant and dangerous group in Algeria, and perhaps the most violent terrorist organization in the world. Women have recently become a primary target, perhaps an act of desperation for a group that seems to be on the way out. The primary weapons of the AIG are bombs, however the method of kidnapping victims and slitting their throats has also recently become popular with the group. This may have come to pass due to the reduction in member numbers the group has experienced. With far fewer bodies required to place a bomb than to engage in a firefight, the AIG seems to be taking the more conservative route with regards to its modus operandi.

The AIG has, however, proven remarkably successful in carrying out high-visibility attacks. Most notable of these was the December 24, 1995 hijacking of an Air France Airbus 300 while is was on the tarmac at the Algiers airport. Posing as airline security officials, the four man team boarded the plane. They promptly killed three hostages prompting quick attention from the French government. After releasing 100 of the 240 passengers while still in Algeria, the hijackers, using the moniker "Phalange of the Signers in Blood", ordered the plane flown to Marseilles. Perhaps noting the terrorists' threat to create a "fireworks" show over the city, French GIGN commandos stormed the plane before it could be flown to, or over, Paris. The subsequent assault resulted in the deaths of the four terrorists, with no losses to the remaining hostages, or the raiding party (although there were numerous injuries from AIG weapons). Currently there is some doubt that AIG is still accepting the leadership of the local Muslim umbrella organization known as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) unlike their primary rivals, the Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS).

Recent incidents On Sept 19, 1997, attackers killed seven people, including five members of one family, near the city of Saida, 220 miles southwest of Algiers. The victims' bodies were found mutilated. In a separate attack, four civilians died after their throats were cut near Medea, about 62 miles south of Algiers. The victims' bodies were mutilated and burned. Government forces continue to exact a toll on the guerrillas as well. In a widely-reported operation in the capital on Sept 14, security forces killed four "terrorists" -- Algeria's word for Moslem rebels -- after a siege in a mosque in Chrarba district in the capital Algiers. La Tribune said the rebels were so well entrenched in the Sidi Abdelkader mosque that security forces finally decided to use heavy weaponry and blow up much of the mosque. Three days earlier, Algerian security forces smashed the main hideout of an elite force of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in one of two operations in which scores of rebels died.

French officials have generally avoided advice or comment on Algerian politics after President Liamine Zeroual accused Paris of meddling in its internal affairs. Algerian guerrilla groups angry at support for Algiers from the former colonial power have claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks in France between July and October 1995. An estimated 60,000 people have died in civil violence since the authorities in January 1992 canceled a general election that the fundamentalists Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win.

Executive Travel

Rules for Emergency Evacuation or How to Get Home When Everything Goes to Hell
by Larry Grupp

Nothing focuses the mind like the sound of gunfire in the distance. Unfortunately, anyone traveling overseas stands a chance of hearing gunfire--and it may not just be in the distance. Because much of the world is politically unstable, business there can be a risky proposition, but that hasn't stopped many people from making money overseas anyway. The element of risk is relative. Anyone expecting conditions to be the same in, say, the Middle East as they are in the United States is probably asking fro trouble. On the other hand, anyone prepared to cope with the differences is already one step ahead of the game. And part of any sound business plan includes preparing to get out of town if things turn really ugly. In early October, 1959, I experienced my first armed insurrection while working in Cuba. I received numerous reports of rebel activity; roadblocks were everywhere and then reports of casulties. Almost desperately, I tried to recall my father's advice regarding getting back home from an international assignment when things got tough. He was from the old "do-it-yourself" school who didn't believe, trust or ever rely on governments--ours or theirs.

I was a typical sixteen-year old teenager discovering, too late, it was best to listen to the old man. I recalled the part about emergency cash, the need to react quickly with a pre-determined plan and something about alternate plans, but here I was in a crummy little out-of-the-way hotel being told my best friend had just been found cruelly tortured to death by the Batistas (central government forces). I didn't have a plan, cash or anything except some Cuban friends. It is shocking how few business executives know the distance to the next border, the location of major roads, rivers and mountain ranges, as well as other vital, practical information. American businesssmen learned their most recent lesson in emergency evacuation planning on August 2, 1990, when Saddam Hussein's tanks rumbled over the top of hapless little Kuwait. Some 3,100 Americans and 4,600 Brits suddenly found that they were involuntary guests of the conquering Iraqi government. As their stay stretched into weeks, it became evident that "hostage" better described these people's condition. They should have applied the time-honored rules for evacuation when they could. Now they found themselves in deep trouble. Perhaps some expatriate foreigners caught in Kuwait could not have turned down Saddam's "hospitality" because they had wives and young children, and emergency evacuation might not have been worth the risk. In reality, however, most were simply negligent in their planning. They could have evacuated themselves fairly easily had they bothered to think their way into their circumstances before the emergency reached its climax. Cuba and Kuwait are not unique. Business executives throughout the world are continually at risk from changing governments, crazy dictators, terrorists, power hungry rebels, and the general fortunes of business and war. No matter what else they may wish or think when the flag goes up, it is incumbent on each individual to implement a preconceived evacuation strategy.

American embassies around the world have an enviable record of assisting US business people in an emergency. However, one must always remember the lesson of Kuwait and the hundreds of Kuwaiti-like situations which have occurred throughout history. Business people like to get into their deals alone and they will have to get out on their own. To a great extent this philosophy is not new or radical. A majority of foreign businessmen inside Kuwait managed to reach freedom in Saudi Arabia, but it is not because the US Embassy passed out instructions telling them how, or because they were encouraged by the Voice of America. They got out because they knew the rules of their chosen business. Rules of the Road Evacuation Rule No. 1 Don't spend too much time thinking. Actr quickly and decisively. Evacuation Rule No. 2 When traveling in places where an emergency retreat may be necessary, carry lots of US cash. Travelers' checks are convenient but not at all useful in emergency situations. I like to carry at least $1,000 in crisp new $100, $50s or $20s in my money belt. In times past I have also used British pounds, Swiss francs, Deutsch marks or French francs, but uusually, good home-grown dollars are as good as you can get. Should the situation really look ominous, such as was true in Kuwait, carry $2,000. When I was there, I carried twenty $100s, some of which were sewn into the bottom of my camera case. If, for some reason, one knows certainly that they are headed for trouble, take along several one ounce gold coins mixed in country's worthless aluminum pocket change.

Few people steal change in this day and age. Gold coins are relatively safer loose in a pocket than sewn in a jacket or in a money belt. Evacuation Rule No. 3 Those who might want to evacuate must carry a complete set of clothes indigenous to the area. These are best purchased at a local market. Years ago when I was in the Philippines, the tan cotton work shirt and pants wouldn't completely disguise me but they certainly would have helped. At least I didn't immediately look like a Westerner to the communist New Peoples' Army and it was not the tan business suit people saw me wear into the hotel or at the airport. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, I bought a long, white flowing Arab robe. The robe would have completely disguised me from those around. Evacuation Rule No. 4 When traveling into an area, always have one main plan gor getting out and a minimum of two others that can be used in case the first proves impossible. The main plan should obviously be something straightforward such as going to the airport and taking a regular scheduled commercial flight out. Alternatives can be anything from walking and/or swimming to hiring a boat, car or plane. When I worked in Kuwait I planned to either hire a camel and go cross country, or walk to safety wherever that was at the moment. In Saudi I planned to take a sailboat to Bahrain. In Mexico I planned to take a bus to a border town and walk across the border from there. In Cagayan there were a number of boats in the bay. For $500 one would have gladly made the three-day journey to Manila by boat, should my main plan of cathing a regular commercial flight have been impossible. When bargaining with people for transportation, it is sometimes best not to flash big bills around. Tell the car, camel or boat owner a friend will pay all of the money at your destination or that you have friends there who will pay. Then give them a healthy down payment. You may have the cash right there, sewn in your ditty bag, but don't get it out unless there is no other course of action.

Several rules are a subset of Rule No. 3. If one's sense of direction is poor and the alternate plan might included a thirty-mile walk through a featureless, dark desert as was true for Americans in Kuwait, carry a compass in an emergency pack. You may not be able to find one in many foreign countries, so don't leave home without it. Other equipment such as a knife, length of rope, water bottle, flashlight can usually be purchased locally. At one time I purchased a water bottle and kitchen knife from a hotel cook in Algeria City, Algeria, thinking I might have to take a bus from Morocco. As part of this alternate strategy, always know where you are. On arriving in a new country, immediately buy a good, complete road map. Maps are not available in some countries. When in doubt, go t a large map store in your own country and purchase what you need before leaving. Traditionally, communist countries have foolish, inaccurate maps. Finally, business people who intend to survive under circumstances of international duress will find it's a do-it-yourself proposition. As in most aspects of business, success will come to those who plan ahead, even in the most rudimentary fashion. Larry Grupp is an international project manager with hands-on experience in over sixty countries. ??


Counter-Hijacking and the Killing Village

Looking like an abandoned city amid the dry forests of Western Australia, stands the "Killing Village" with its multi-story buildings, including an embassy, office block, semi-detached houses and shopping center - all mock-ups. One of the world's most complete counter-terrorist training grounds, it was built by the Australian SAS and is used by special units from all over the world willing to pay generous fees. At first nothing appears to be happening. A few vehicles are stationed in the car park with its yellow meters in front of the two-story shopping complex. Broken glass and spent 9mm brass casings are strewn everywhere within the rubber-coated concrete walls of the various buildings. It has the feeling of an empty movie set. Then there is a mechanical noise, like a conveyor belt. Moving on rails leading out from the shopping center are four robots. One is done up as a female complete with plastic breasts while the rest are males. Two are armed with what seem like real pistols pointing at the heads of the hostages. They stand for moment near a red Toyota, then move back on the rails which disappear into the building. Hidden up in twin towers which rise above the middle of the set, two pairs of SAS snipers have been observing this staged drama through their telescopic sights for days. They also see pneumatic targets popping up behind the windows of the shopping complex, and buzz central control over their walkie-talkies each time to identify if they are seeing a hostage or a terrorist. Lying on the hard gray steel floors, aiming German-made PSG-1 high precision rifles which rest on small tripods, the marksmen are sure never to let the barrels protrude through the windows, their hands at all times firmly holding the grips, their forefingers brushing the triggers. Replacement rifle barrels are laid out to one side.

The men in each pair alternate the watch, taking turns sleeping, eating and relieving themselves in plastic bags which are collected during the night. The multimillion dollar construction contract for the "killing village" was awarded to Australian Construction Services. The various buildings were equipped with interchangeable walls wired for moving targets and computer simulations of hostage scenarios for realistic indoor room clearings. The investment soon began paying off, literally, as 22 SAS, Delta, SEALs, Japanese police SWAT teams and other units paid good money to come to Perth and use what some have called the most sophisticated Counter-terrorism training facility in the world. "Training at the Killing Village has to take into account the kind of instruction being offered to international terrorists," explains Sgt. Bob Mawkes who was put in charge of the Australian SAS CT program. For example, intelligence shared between the various CT units in the early eighties indicated that Muammar Gaddafi had made Libya's national airline available for groups like the Palestinian extremist Abu Nidal to practice hijackings. "We had to do the same in order to counter it," says Mawkes. Qantas Airlines provided the Australian SAS with an airliner in which to train in anti-hijacking.

British Airways did the same for 22 SAS, Eastern Airlines provided one of their jetliners for Delta, Lufthansa for the GSG9 and Air France made its entire air fleet readily available to the GIGN. Counter-hijacking is considered one of the most dangerous and risky special forces operations. "If you can master that you should be able to do anything," says Philippe Legorjus of the GIGN, which has trained on every kind of airliner there is, from small DC9s to Jumbos. As a result of rehearsing counter-hijacking once a month, the GIGN claims to be the best at it. One exercise consists of abseiling by rope from a helicopter flying at sixty feet on to the fuselage of an airliner taxiing on a runway and gaining access to the interior through the escape hatches. Legorjus, Christian Prouteau and the GIGN's current commander, Captain Denis de Favier, all maintain that the French group has developed a secret method of penetrating a closed aircraft without using explosives.

"We have learned how it is possible to open a plane's emergency door from the outside," elaborates Prouteau. According to him, the GIGN has used this system on three occasions. In one incident in which an IRA terrorist commandeered a plane at gunpoint from London to north-west France, the GIGN's main fear was of a booby-trap bomb which the hijacker had rigged inside the aircraft. Taking advantage of demands for food to be brought to the plane, four GIGN men gained access to the plane by pretending to be stewards carrying the pile of trays. Overpowering the gunman by quickly getting him in an arm and head lock and with a .38 revolver brushing his temple, they managed to disconnect the detonation device for the bomb, which he was carrying on him. When Delta once rehearsed such a deceptive method for entering an aircraft, the men playing the terrorists insisted that those bringing the food take off all their clothes. While the standard counter-hijacking technique involves 'engaging down the fuselage', as at Mogadishu, a ploy in which the assault team breaks inside through two or three points, hitting the terrorists from a distance, the SAS and GIGN also practice flooding the aircraft through as many points as possible. Some men might try to gain access through the luggage compartment beneath the fuselage or roof hatches to try to get in as near to the terrorists as possible and engage them in close quarter battle. Taking the aircraft from many points, however, requires meticulous, split-second coordination, otherwise it can go disastrously wrong.

When Egyptian commandos of the counter-terrorist 777 force tried storming an Egypt Air flight hijacked to Malta by having part of the team enter through the roof hatch, they overcharged the explosives placed there and the plane caught fire. Since none of the exits had yet been opened, ladders were not in place and commandos crouching along the wings ready to blow open the emergency doors were jolted off the plane by the violent explosion. Fifty-seven passengers died trying to get out of the burning aircraft. One of the terrorists escaped. Counter-hijacking involves assessing everything about an aircraft---its weight, how much fuel it has, the number of people on board, the quantity of luggage. It also requires training a normal-sized team about twenty men to move inconspicuously through the security checks of an airport in civilian dress while carrying concealed weapons. The ability to move as anonymously as the terrorists themselves became very necessary for Delta Force when it was called in to deal with the hijacking of a TWA flight in October 1985. The flight from Athens had been diverted to Beirut by two gunmen of the Islamic Jihad. Some hostages were released in Lebanon as ten terrorist reinforcements were picked up and the hijacked airliner flew on to Algiers. The Algerian government was highly ambivalent about allowing a US military rescue mission on its territory but let it be known that if the American team acted with sufficient speed and discretion, it would turn a blind eye. The Delta team were inside the airport at Algiers, prepared to assault the hijacked plane by the time US Secretary of State George Shultz authorized the mission to go ahead. Gut mid-level officers in the State Department's "crisis management team" held up the paperwork and the hijacked flight took off to return to Beirut, where the 32 hostages were taken off the plane, distributed around Shiite-held areas of the city and a rescue operation was no longer feasible. The U.S. was forced to cave in to the terrorist demands, pressuring Israel to release 700 Shiite prisoners. The carefully planned shuttle between Algiers and Beirut was a clear indication that the terrorists had also been learning about special forces methods and were careful not to remain in any single airport long enough to allow a counter-hijack operation to be set up. By their international nature, aircraft hijackings require different counter-terrorist teams to work closely together and become familiar with each other's methods. During incidents in which a hijacked aircraft moves between different airports, a constant information flow is required between the special forces concerned as the jurisdictions change. During one hijacking by Abu Nidal in which the plane landed in Cyprus before going on to Algeria, the SAS and GIGN coordinated their activity and information at all times.

"While the plane was in Cyprus, the responsibility for a rescue operation was with the SAS and when it flew on to Algeria, where we had better contacts, it switched over to the GIGN," explains Philippe Legorjus. "We had to get all the up-to-the-minute information the British were gathering about the plane, passengers, terrorist team, and know the entry plan they had devised as we planned our own." Both units set up a computer link to interface their information instantly. CT organizations cooperated in a similar way during another hijacking between the former French African colony of Niger and the former British colony of Nigeria and since there were West Germans on board the plane, the GSG9 got involved as well. When "engaging down fuselage" in storming an airliner, a counter-hijacking team needs to move quickly down the aisle in a single file, shooting at the targets over each other's heads. A "continuous fire" drill developed by the GSG9 and adopted by other CT teams to get themselves used to firing in support of each other within very close proximity consists of three lines of men moving on static targets. Each line alternates between standing, kneeling and lying as they move past each other firing their sub-machine guns until all the men are within point-blank range of the targets. It is part of the instinctive shooting techniques, which any counter-terrorist operative masters when he enters the "killing village." Written by Martin C. Arostegui, a journalist and counterterrorism expert and author of a new book called: Twilight Warriors: Inside the World's Special Forces. Published by St. Martin's Press, N.Y., hardback, 308 pages, $24.95 Contact the IACSP office for more information.
 

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